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We conduct a laboratory experiment where third-party spectators can re-
distribute resources between two agents, thereby offsetting the conse-
quences of controllable and uncontrollable luck. Some spectators go to the 
limits and equalize all or no inequalities, but many follow an interior allo-
cation rule previously unaccounted for by the fairness views in the litera-
ture. These interior allocators regard an agent’s choice as more important 
than the cause of her low income and do not always compensate bad un-
controllable luck. Instead, they condition such compensation on the agent’s 
decision regarding controllable luck exposure, even though the two types 
of luck are independent. 
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The question of what constitutes a fair distribution of resources is interesting in itself but even 
more important as it has implications for numerous economically relevant phenomena, such as 
the design of redistributive tax policies (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Krawczyk, 2010) and bar-
gaining behavior (Gächter and Riedl, 2005, 2006). In this paper we study fairness preferences in 
risky environments and ask how people’s fairness ideals differentiate between situations involv-
ing bad luck that is the result of a choice (bad option luck) and those involving bad luck resulting 
from randomness that cannot be avoided (bad brute luck).  
Option luck is “a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out – whether someone 
gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she […] might have declined” (Dworkin, 
2000, p. 73). Brute luck, on the other hand is “a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that 
sense deliberate gambles” (ibid). In other words: if a person goes blind as a result of a genetic 
condition, her brute luck is bad, but if she buys a lottery ticket and wins, her option luck is good 
(Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001). 
In the laboratory experiment reported in this paper we investigate how a disinterested third party 
(a spectator) divides resources between two other agents. We specifically consider the case 
where the resources to be divided are generated through a risky process which the agents can 
only partly control – i.e. both option and brute luck are present. Based on previous research, we 
expect (and confirm) that a significant fraction of spectators either equalize all inequalities be-
tween the two agents (i.e. they are strict egalitarians) or they equalize no inequalities (i.e. they 
are libertarians).1  
The focus of this paper is, however, on the many people who are interior allocators and some-
times, but not always, choose the equalizing option. In both the normative and the descriptive 
literature on social preferences a popular candidate for this intermediate norm is one that condi-
tions compensation for a bad outcome on its cause. More specifically, this norm states that a fair 
distribution of resources should even out inequalities that do not reflect choices that an agent has 
made, and over which she therefore lacked control.  
                                                            
1 Strict egalitarianism and libertarianism are similar, although not always identical, to the notions of ex-post and ex-
ante egalitarianism respectively, see for example Cappelen et al. (2007, 2013). In the particular experimental design 
described here, the behavioral predictions of strict egalitarianism and ex-post egalitarianism overlap as do the 
behavioral predictions of libertarianism and ex-ante egalitarianism.  
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In philosophy this norm is referred to as luck egalitarianism which is the term we will use (ca-
nonical texts are Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; and Dworkin, 2000). This norm has also been studied in 
economics by for example Konow (1996) who calls it the accountability principle. In his words, “the 
Accountability Principle […] requires that a person’s fair allocation (e.g. of income) vary in proportion to 
the relevant variables that he can influence (e.g. work effort) but not according to those that he cannot 
reasonably influence (e.g. a physical handicap)” (Konow, 1996, p. 13).  
Empirical research has indicated that luck egalitarianism provides a good description of people’s 
actual distributive behavior. One example can be found in Konow (2000). He shows in a labora-
tory experiment that when the resources that are to be divided are generated randomly, outside 
the control of the agents, disinterested spectators almost always implement an equal split. How-
ever, when the resources come about through efforts of the agents, Konow finds that the specta-
tors’ split is proportional to the agents’ respective effort levels.2  
A key assumption underlying luck egalitarianism is that uncontrollable and controllable factors 
are treated separately in the sense that agents are not held responsible for behavior that did not 
cause or influence the outcome. However, this assumption has to our knowledge never been ex-
plicitly tested. The reason is that previous studies, including Konow (2000), have not allowed for 
situations in which the spectator has been aware of the agents’ actions with respect to controlla-
ble factors at the same time as it has turned out that it was the uncontrollable factors that caused 
the outcome.  
Our experimental design solves this problem by having both controllable option luck and uncon-
trollable brute luck present and easily distinguishable. For a luck egalitarian spectator, who con-
ditions compensations for a bad outcome on its cause, a fair distribution only holds agents re-
sponsible for outcomes that they could control. In our experiment this would imply that she 
compensates agents for bad outcomes that are due to bad brute luck but not those that are due to 
bad option luck.  
This is, however, not the behavior we find. Instead, a large share of spectators makes bad brute 
luck compensation conditional on how the agent handles option luck. These spectators only 
                                                            
2 For other experimental investigations of luck egalitarianism and the accountability principle, see e.g. Schokkeart 
and Devooght (2003) and Becker (2013).  
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compensate an agent who experiences bad brute luck when she also avoided exposure to option 
luck, even though the outcome would not have been affected if the agent had made a different 
option luck decision. We label this norm choice compensation.  
This behavior is inconsistent with fairness views where the definition of a fair distribution de-
pends on the cause of the outcome, such as luck egalitarianism. Instead, it suggests a fairness 
view that is agency dependent, i.e. conditional on aspects of the agent’s behavior, regardless of 
whether this behavior mattered for the outcome or not. Taken together, the spectators in our ex-
periment are well described if we assume that there are three types: libertarians, strict egalitari-
ans and choice compensators. We find very limited support for the existence of luck egalitarians. 
Our results can be related to those of Cappelen et al. (2013), who share our interest in fairness 
views in circumstances involving risk taking. They find support for a fairness norm that holds 
people responsible for their choices but not for their luck and endorses redistribution between 
people who make the same decision regarding risk exposure. However, as their design has only 
controllable option luck present they cannot test, as we do, the extent to which an agent’s respon-
sibility for a choice made in a controllable situation carries over into an uncontrollable context in 
which the choice was irrelevant. 
From here, the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the experimental design. Section II 
investigates how agents’ bad brute luck is compensated (or not) by the spectators in the experi-
ment. Section III provides a model of the distributive choices made in the experiment and pre-
sents the result of a maximum likelihood estimation of which fairness norms the spectator be-
haves in accordance with. Section IV concludes. 
I. The experiment 
A. Design 
Each experimental session was identical and consisted of three parts with all subjects participat-
ing in all parts3. In the first part all participants were informed that they each had been allocated 
an endowment of $24. They were told that at the end of part 1, one of three equally probable 
                                                            
3 Participants were told at the beginning of the session that there would be several parts and that instructions would 
be given for one part at a time, ahead of that part. Instructions can be found in Appendix A.  
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events would be drawn: A, B or C. If event A would be drawn for a participant, she would keep 
her endowment whereas if event B or C were drawn, she would lose her endowment. 
Before the events were drawn, all participants were given a choice about whether or not to buy 
an insurance that would protect against the loss associated with event B. This insurance would 
not protect the agent against the loss associated with event C. Participants were informed that the 
price of the insurance would be $12, but that this would only have to be paid if the participant 
ended up keeping her endowment. This implies that a participant who chose to insure against 
event B would end up with $12 if event A or B were drawn (she would then keep the endowment 
of $24 and pay the cost of the insurance) but nothing if event C was drawn. A participant who 
chose not to insure would get $24 if event A was drawn, and nothing if event B or C were 
drawn.4 
The fact that agents could insure against only one source of loss gives rise to a situation where 
both uncontrollable and controllable elements are present. As it was impossible to eliminate the 
risk associated with event C, we have that this event constitutes bad brute luck in our experiment. 
On the other hand, the optional insurance against the loss associated with event B guaranteed the 
presence of option luck.  
After the participants had decided whether or not to buy the insurance, they were informed that 
an event had been drawn for them that would be revealed at the end of the experiment. Thereaf-
ter, part 2 of the experiment started in which participants were randomly paired. They were in-
formed that they were to make choices regarding the distribution of income from part 1 for an-
other pair of participants referred to as Person 1 (P1) and Person 2 (P2) and that this choice 
would have no monetary consequences for themselves. This implies that they would make deci-
sions as a disinterested spectator for another pair.5  
                                                            
4 Note that the insurance offered to the participants was actuarially fair as the expected value was USD 8 regardless 
of whether insurance was bought or not. Participants were explicitly pointed to this fact. The design choice to have a 
fair insurance was made in order to avoid concerns regarding an efficiency loss related to the insurance. A variation 
in the cost of insurance would, however, constitute an interesting avenue for future research.  
5 Previous research on social and distributive preferences has studied the behavior of both stakeholders (Cappelen et 
al., 2007; Cherry et al., 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frohlich et al., 2004) and 
disinterested spectators (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; and Konow, 2000, 2009). 
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The strategy method was used and each spectator saw, and made decisions in, several situations 
involving P1 and P2. In each situation the spectator was informed about the insurance choices, 
the events drawn and the earnings for both participants in the pair (we refer to a combination of 
an event and a choice as an outcome). There were two spectators matched to each pair and par-
ticipants were informed that one of the two spectators’ choices would be randomly chosen and 
implemented for the pair.  
All spectators made distribution decisions in the 11 situations summarized in Table 1. These sit-
uations were chosen as they constitute all possible outcomes from part 1 that resulted in unequal 
earnings between P1 and P2 (if earnings were equal, the options in the binary choice coincided 
and the spectator’s decision was uninteresting). The table also shows the earnings from part 1 for 
both people in the pair. In each situation the spectator had to decide whether to leave earnings 
unchanged, or to equalize them.6 
The spectators saw, and made decisions in, the situations one at a time in the order outlined in 
the table. After every third choice they were showed a summary of the three most recent deci-
sions (the summary screen after the last choice only showed the most recent two choices). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Cappelen et al. (2013) find that agents’ behavior is fundamentally determined by the same principles regardless of 
whether they act as stakeholder or spectators but Aguiar et al. (2013) find that this is not the case. In order to 
investigate whether our results would be different if the spectators had themselves not made the insurance decision, 
we also conducted a version of our experiment where the roles were separated and participants made decisions in 
either part 1 or in part 2. The details of this version of the experiment are reported in Appendix B where we show 
that all conclusions drawn here are valid also in that setting. Appendix B also investigates the relation, in the original 
experiment, between the spectators’ own insurance decision and her choice of whether or not to equalize outcomes 
for other participants.  
6 If a pair ended up in a situation that was not covered by these 11 situations, i.e. a situation where they ended up 
with the same amount, a twelfth situation was added for the spectators matched to them which displayed what the 
two participants were actually experiencing. This was done in order to make sure that it was always true that the 
division was decided by the spectators matched to the pair. Note that it was still not possible for the spectators to 
know which situation had occurred for their matched pair since the number of situations was not announced in 
advance.  
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spectators then had the opportunity to revise their decisions if they so desired or to simply con-
firm the original decision.7 
 
After participants had made decisions in the 11 situations they were presented with their earnings 
and thereafter, in the third part of the experiment, they answered a questionnaire.8 
B. Implementation 
The experiment was conducted at the Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER) at the 
Harvard Business School in August and September 2012. A total of 152 people, who could only 
take part once, participated (average age 24 years, 49 percent females). They were rewarded with 
on average USD 20 (including a fixed show-up fee) for their participation in a session that lasted 
approximately 40 minutes.  
                                                            
7 We gave participants this option in order to provide an additional opportunity for them to contemplate their choice. 
The option was not widely used: only 4.3 percent of decisions were changed on the summary screens. No results 
reported here are sensitive to using only original choices. 
8 The post-experimental questionnaire contained demographic questions, a question about how important fairness 
considerations was when making the decision about how to split earnings between the two people in the pair, and a 
question about personal risk preferences. Data from the questionnaire are presented in Appendix C.  
Table 1. The 11 decisions
Situation
P1: Outcome 
from part 1
P2: Outcome 
from part 1
P1: Earnings 
from part 1
P2: Earnings 
from part 1
1 AIN BIN 24 0
2 AIN CIN 24 0
3 AIN BIN 24 12
4 BIN CIN 12 0
5 AIN CIN 24 0
6 BIN CIN 12 0
7 BIN BIN 12 0
8 AIN CIN 12 0
9 AIN AIN 24 12
10 AIN CIN 12 0
11 AIN BIN 12 0
IN 
The  participant chose  to buy the  insurance  against the  loss  associated with event B.            
For expos i tiona l  ease  this  table  presents  the  s i tuations  such that P1 always  has  higher 
earnings  than P2 from part 1. In the  experiment this  ordering was  not imposed.
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The experiment was computerized using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
In order to ensure common knowledge, the experimenter read the instructions out loud in addi-
tion to them being given on the participants’ computer screens. A summary of the instructions 
was also provided on paper. On two occasions (before the start of each of the two parts) partici-
pants had to correctly answer a quiz on the instructions in order to be able to continue. Only very 
few participants experienced problems with the questions (and all results are robust to excluding 
these observations), but those who did were provided with repeated instructions by the experi-
menter.  
II. Situations with and without bad brute luck  
We start by considering the insurance choice that participants made in the first part of the ex-
periment. We can conclude that there was significant variation in insurance choice as 121 par-
ticipants chose to insure whereas 31 did not. This, in turn, is important as it validates our inter-
pretation of both option and brute luck being present in the experiment.9  
We next look at the participants’ choices when acting as spectators in part 2 of the experiment. 
Considering again the situations that the spectators faced, which are outlined in Table 1, we note 
that situations 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 involved bad brute luck. In these situations event C, against 
which it was not possible to insure, was drawn for one person in the pair. In Figure 1 we investi-
gate which fraction of the spectators decided to equalize earnings between P1 and P2 in these 
situations and compare this to their behavior in the remaining situations, which did not involve 
bad brute luck. The figure indicates that equalizing choices were more common in situations in-
volving bad brute luck, a difference that is highly statistically significant (p < 0.01).10 
This means that we, at least at an aggregate level, replicate the finding from previous studies that 
there is more redistribution of resources in situations that involve elements that are outside the 
control of the agents, such as bad brute luck. This could easily be interpreted as an indication that 
                                                            
9 If there had been no variation in the insurance choice it could have been argued that the choice was not ”real”, and 
that all events hence consituted brute luck.  
10 All p-values reported are from t-tests with standard errors clustered on participant level. This conclusion also 
holds when we control for the absolute size of the difference in output between P1 and P2 (result reported in 
Appendix D). 
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a significant proportion of the spectators follow a norm where they compensate agents for out-
comes that are due to bad brute luck but not for those due to bad option luck, i.e. that many 
spectators are luck egalitarians. As an illustration, note that if 10 percent of our sample consisted 
of luck egalitarians, 50 percent of libertarians and 40 percent of strict egalitarians, the pattern 
from Figure 1 is what we would expect.  
 
 
 
We now turn to investigating whether the assumption from luck egalitarianism about spectators 
treating brute and option luck separately holds. Table 2 displays the data from all choices the 
spectators made. In order to better understand how the spectators handled situations where one of 
the agents suffered bad brute luck, we utilize the fact that the six situations involving bad brute 
luck can be divided into three pairs where the insurance choice of P1 and the outcomes for both 
P1 and P2 from part 1 are held constant. The only thing that differs between the two situations in 
each pair is whether P2 bought insurance or not.  
Error bars mark standard errors, clustered on participant. N= 1672 (152 
spectators).  
Figure 1. Share of equalizing choices in situations with and 
without bad brute luck
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Consider first situations 2 and 5. In situation 2, P1 chose not to insure and in part 1 event A was 
randomly drawn for her, leaving her with $24. The circumstances for P1 were the same in situa-
tion 5. In both situations, the event that was drawn for P2 was C, i.e. the event that it was not 
possible to insure against, leaving P2 with no earnings from part 1. However, in situation 2, P2 
had not insured against the loss associated with event B, whereas in situation 5 she bought this 
insurance. As is evident from the table, this made a significant difference with regards to whether 
earnings were equalized or not. Whereas just below half of the spectators (49.3 percent) equal-
ized earnings in situation 2, 73 percent did so in situation 5, a difference that is highly statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.01).  
We now turn to situations 4 and 6. In these two situations P1 chose to insure, and got a draw of 
event B, leaving her with $12 from the first part. P2 again got a draw of C, but had chosen to in-
sure against the loss associated with event B in only one of the two situations. Again, spectators 
were significantly more willing to equalize earnings in the situation where P2 chose to buy the 
insurance (62.5 percent) compared to the situation where she did not (27.0 percent) (p < 0.01). A 
similar pattern can be found in situations 8 and 10, with 63.8 percent of spectators equalizing 
payoffs when P2 had bought the insurance compared to 27.0 percent when she chose not to in-
sure (p < 0.01).  
Table 2. Spectator behavior, by situation
Situation
P1: Outcome 
from part 1
P2: Outcome 
from part 1
Percent equalized 
earnings
1 AIN BIN 50.0 (4.07)
2 AIN CIN 49.3 (4.07)
3 AIN BIN 54.6 (4.05)
4 BIN CIN 62.5 (3.94)
5 AIN CIN 73.0 (3.61)
6 BIN CIN 27.0 (3.61)
7 BIN BIN 23.0 (3.42)
8 AIN CIN 27.0 (3.61)
9 AIN AIN 56.6 (4.03)
10 AIN CIN 63.8 (3.91)
11 AIN BIN 21.1 (3.31)
IN The  participant chose  to buy the  insurance  against the  loss  associated with event B. 
Robust s tandard errors  in parentheses . N=152.
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From this we can conclude that situations where inequality had arisen because of an event of bad 
brute luck was treated very differently depending on which choice the agent who was subject to 
the bad brute luck made regarding exposure to option luck, i.e. if she had bought the insurance 
protecting her from the loss associated with event B or not. This was so even though this deci-
sion was irrelevant for the inequality at hand.  
To summarize, we see that the uncontrollable and controllable situations are not treated sepa-
rately in the way that luck egalitarianism, which conditions compensation for bad outcomes on 
their cause, assumes. Instead, the reason that earnings in situations involving bad brute luck on 
average are equalized to a large extent seems to be that many spectators compensate some in-
stances of brute luck, namely those where the agent chose to minimize exposure to the risk asso-
ciated with option luck. This, in turn, leads us to conclude that it may be more appropriate to 
describe these spectators as “choice compensators”, i.e. they condition compensation for low 
earnings on the agent’s choice to minimize exposure to option luck rather than on which event 
that actually caused the low earnings.  
III. Estimation of fairness ideals  
A. Conceptual framework 
All distributive decisions in the experiment were made by spectators without any monetary self-
interest in the distribution of pay-offs. We follow Cappelen et al. (2013) and assume a model in 
which a spectator incurs an internal cost when the amount ݕ that she allocates to an agent devi-
ates from ܨ௞, i.e. from what the fair allocation would be according to the spectator’s fairness 
ideal ݇:  
 ܸሺݕ;·ሻ ൌ െ݂ሺݕ, ܨ௞;·ሻ. (1)
We assume that the cost of acting unfairly is increasing in the absolute value of the difference 
between what an agent is allocated and what her fair income would be, and focus on the case 
where the loss function in equation (1) is quadratic. The (trivial) solution to the spectator’s opti-
mization problem is then given by ݕכ ൌ ܨ௞. 
Building on previous research, we hypothesize that some spectators behave in accordance with 
strict egalitarianism (SE) and want to equalize all outcomes, and that some are libertarians (L) 
12 
 
who do not want to equalize any outcomes. In the setting of our experiment we then get that the 
fair allocation to P1 (which implicitly also defines the fair allocation to P2) for these spectators 
are: 
 ܨଵௌா ൌ
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ
2
, 
 
(2)
 ܨଵ௅ ൌ ݔଵ, 
 
(3)
where ݔ௜ denotes person i’s earnings from part 1. 
We also expect there to be spectators whose behavior fall in neither of these extreme categories. 
One alternative intermediate norm is luck egalitarianism (LE), meaning that the spectator condi-
tion compensation to the person with the lowest income on the underlying cause. More precisely, 
a luck egalitarian spectator compensates when the low income is caused by bad brute luck and 
then only compensates the part that was due to the bad brute luck, neutralizing the role of option 
luck.  
To define the luck egalitarian position it is essential to discriminate between situations with and 
without bad brute luck. Let the events drawn for P1 and P2 be denoted ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ א ࣟ ൌ ሼܣ, ܤ, ܥሽ and 
partition ࣟ into events with bad brute luck, ܤܮ௕௔ௗ  ൌ ሼܥሽ, in which agents get paid nothing and 
events without bad brute luck, ܤܮ௚௢௢ௗ  ൌ ሼܣ, ܤሽ, in which deviations in earnings from the insur-
ance value ݔூே (which in our setting, with an actuarially fair insurance, is $12) is always a matter 
of option luck. A luck egalitarian spectator only wants to compensate an agent who suffered bad 
brute luck for the part of the inequality that stems directly from this source. Hence is not the case 
that she necessarily equalizes the full income differences just because an agent suffered bad brute 
luck. In our experimental setting we get the following fair allocation to P1 under luck egalitari-
anism (LE):  
 
 
 
ܨଵ௅ா = 
 
ݔଵ if ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ א ܤܮ௕௔ௗ or ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ א ܤܮ௚௢௢ௗ, 
ݔଵ െ
ݔூே
2
 if ݁ଵ א ܤܮ௚௢௢ௗ and ݁ଶ א ܤܮ௕௔ௗ. 
     
 
(4)
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Finally, given the results presented in Section II another alternative norm is choice compensation 
(CC), i.e. that the spectator condition compensation to the person with the lowest earnings on her 
choice regarding exposure to option luck. We denote the insurance choices for P1 and P2 
ܿଵ, ܿଶ א ࣝ ൌ ሼݕ݁ݏ, ݊݋ሽ and get, in our experimental setting, the following fair allocation to P1 
under CC (remembering that P1 always has a higher earning than P2): 
 
 
 
ܨଵ
஼஼ = 
ݔଵ if ܿଶ ൌ ݊݋, 
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ
2
 if ܿଶ ൌ ݕ݁ݏ. 
 
(5)
Table 3 outlines what behavior these four fairness norms predict in the 11 situations in which 
spectators made decisions in our experiment.  
 
Note that luck egalitarian spectators in situations 2 and 5 are indifferent between equalizing 
earnings or not. Equation (4) tells us that in these situations a luck egalitarian spectator would 
prefer to split the total earnings of 24 in such a way that P1 receives 18 and P2 receives 6. The 
reason is that she only wants to compensate for the part of the inequality that stems directly from 
the bad brute luck of the person with the lower earnings. However, as this option was not al-
Table 3. Predicted behavior
Situation
P1: Outcome 
from part 1
P2: Outcome 
from part 1
Strict 
Egalitarianism
Libertarianism
Luck 
Egalitarianism
Choice 
Compensation
1 AIN BIN E NE NE NE
2 AIN CIN E NE Indiff NE
3 AIN BIN E NE NE E
4 BIN CIN E NE E E
5 AIN CIN E NE Indiff E
6 BIN CIN E NE E NE
7 BIN BIN E NE NE NE
8 AIN CIN E NE E NE
9 AIN AIN E NE NE E
10 AIN CIN E NE E E
11 AIN BIN E NE NE NE
IN The  participant chose  to buy the  insurance  against the  loss  associated with event B.                                                      
E=Equal ize, NE=Not equa l ize, Indi ff=Indi fferent.
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lowed in the experiment, luck egalitarian spectators are indifferent because the available options 
generate the same deviation from the fair distribution.11 
B. Exact classification of spectators 
Considering all 11 choices, the data show that whereas 13.1 and 19.6 percent of spectators made 
decisions that are exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism and libertarianism respectively, 
only one person (0.7 percent) made luck egalitarian choices. 7.8 percent made choice compen-
sating decisions.  
 
These data are outlined in Table 4 where we also show that the conclusion of their being com-
paratively few luck egalitarians is not sensitive to allowing the spectators to occasionally make 
small deviations from the respective fairness ideal. 
C. Estimation of choice model  
In order to conduct a structural estimation of which norms the spectators in our experiment be-
have in accordance with, we continue to follow Cappelen et al. (2013) and assume a choice ran-
dom utility model 
 ܷሺݕ;·ሻ ൌ ߛ௜ܸሺݕ;·ሻ ൅ ߳௜௬ for ݕ א ሼݔ, ܺ/2ሽ, (6)
                                                            
11 Since luck egalitarians are allowed to make either choice in two situations (a flexibility not granted to strict 
egalitarians, libertarians or choice compensators), it may seem easier for a participant to be categorized as a luck 
egalitarian than to be categorized as behaving in accordance with any of the other norms. However, the results 
reported in Table 4 and 5 are robust to removing this flexibility for luck egalitarianism and instead demanding 
equalizing choices in situations 2 and 5.  
Table 4. Share of spectators by norm, percent
No deviations Max 1 deviation Max 2 deviations
Strict egalitarians (SE) 13.2 (2.75) 15.8 (2.97) 18.4 (3.15)
Libertarians (L) 19.1 (3.20) 23.0 (3.43) 25.0 (3.52)
Luck egalitarians (LE) 0.7 (0.66) 0.7 (0.66) 4.6 (1.70)
Choice compensators (CC) 7.9 (2.19) 15.1 (2.91) 28.3 (3.67)
Standard errors  in parentheses . No deviations  indicate  the  share  of spectators  whose  
behavior exactly correspond to the  predictions  of the  respective  fa i rness  norm. Max 1 
deviation and Max 2 deviations  indicates  the  same  share  but with one  and two 
deviations  from the  fa i rness  norm al lowed, respectively. N=152
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where ߳௜௬ is assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value. The parameter ߛ௜ determines a spectator’s 
willingness to trade off deviating from her fairness ideal given random utility shocks to the alter-
natives available in each situation. In the limit case where ߛ௜ ൌ 0 choice probabilities are always 
uniform, whereas as γ୧ ՜ ∞ choices converge to always being in line with the prediction of the 
fairness ideal. We want to estimate the distribution of γ୧ and the population share for each of the 
fairness views: λୗ୉ (share of strict egalitarians), λ୐ (libertarians), λ୐୉ (luck egalitarians) and λେେ 
(choice compensators).  
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 5. Specification (1) confirms the conclusion 
from Table 4, that only very few of our spectators exhibit a behavior that is in line with the pre-
dictions of luck egalitarianism. By comparing specification (1) with specification (2), where luck 
egalitarianism is excluded, we note that even though luck egalitarianism does contribute margin-
ally to the likelihood, the explanatory power of this norm is small.  
 
As is also evident from specifications (1) and (2), substantial (and about equally large) shares of 
the spectator can be described as strict egalitarians, libertarians and choice compensators respec-
Table 5. Estimation results
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share strict egalitarian, λSE 0.334 0.343 0.383 0.461
(0.049) (0.049) (0.058) (0.057)
Share libertarian, λL 0.313 0.314 0.572 0.539
(0.046) (0.046) (0.069) (0.057)
Share luck egalitarian, λLE 0.01
(0.013)
Share choice compensation, λCC 0.339 0.343 0.427 0.617
(0.051) (0.051) (0.079) (0.058)
μ ‐0.873 ‐0.912 ‐10.821 ‐1.313 ‐1.600
(0.179) (0.173) (18.884) (0.105) (0.157)
σ 2.149 2.141 10.990 27.124 7.158
(0.357) (0.334) (18.459) (16090) (81.97)
log L ‐817 ‐818 ‐938 ‐976 ‐904
The  dis tribution of γi i s  parametrized such that log γ ~ N(μ, σ
2
). One  idea l  i s  estimated res idual ly, and standard 
errors  (in parentheses) are  calculated from the  estimated parameters  us ing the  Delta  method. The  estimation 
approach uses  BFGS to maximize  the  l i kel ihood, after an ini tia l  search for starting va lues . Tota l  number of 
decis ions  = 1672, tota l  number of spectators  = 152. 
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tively. In specifications (3)-(5) we remove, in turn, one of these three fairness norms. This leads 
to substantially lower likelihood values, which tells us that all three fairness norms are important 
in order to account for the observed choices. This conclusion is corroborated by how the esti-
mated distribution of ߛ changes between specification (1)-(2) on the one hand and (3)-(5) on the 
other hand. The latter all have extreme values of ߪ, indicating numerical problems with fitting 
the model without one of these ideals as it then needs to predict uniform choice probabilities for 
a substantial fraction of the participants in order to fit data.12 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on fairness views in situations where the outcome is determined by 
luck. We jointly consider two types of luck: brute luck, which the individual cannot influence, 
and option luck, the exposure to which is in control of the individual. In the experiment we study 
which fairness norms people adhere to when they act as spectators and distribute resources be-
tween two other agents.  
There are three main findings. First, we document that the spectators are, on average, more likely 
to equalize earnings between agents in situations where bad brute luck played a role in generat-
ing the initial inequality. This might lead one to believe that a significant fraction of spectators 
are luck egalitarians who condition compensation for a bad outcome on its cause. However, our 
second finding is that spectators do not treat brute and option luck separately, as they should if 
they were behaving in accordance with this norm. Our third finding is that instead many specta-
tors condition compensation for bad brute luck on the agent’s choice about option luck exposure. 
We call this fairness norm “choice compensation” and use a choice model to estimate which 
share of spectators adhere to the different fairness ideals. We find that our data is well explained 
by a model with three types: libertarians, strict egalitarians and choice compensators, who each 
make up about a third of our sample. We find very little support for the existence of luck egali-
tarians.  
Our investigation is descriptive rather than normative and the finding that spectators are choice 
compensators rather than luck egalitarians is not an evaluation of the moral standing of these 
norms. It is simply a description of how the participants in our experiment handle the joint pres-
                                                            
12 Further details about the maximum likelihood estimation, and a measure of model fit, are available in appendix E. 
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ence of uncontrollable and controllable events when making redistributive decisions. Our find-
ings show that it may not be enough to consider the cause behind a particular situation in order to 
understand how fairness is assessed. Other factors preceding the situation, such as a choice, may 
be more important even when they do not actually influence the outcome.  
How can we understand the notion of choice compensation as compared to luck egalitarianism? 
The two norms are similar in the sense that both have responsibility for own choices at the core. 
The difference is that whereas luck egalitarians apply this responsibility only in circumstances 
that an agent can control, the choice compensators extend it to also encompass situations where 
the choice neither caused nor affected the outcome.  
There are several reasons why this behavior could arise. Choice compensating spectators may, 
for example, want to reward “good behavior” (if they regarded buying the insurance as the cor-
rect thing to do). Another possibility is that spectators use the insurance choice as a signal about 
a person’s type (as the insurance decision involves a fair gamble it seems a natural basis for dis-
tinguishing for example between risk averse and risk loving people): If spectators care differ-
ently about different types (or simply desire to respect preferences), it is then natural that they 
condition their distribution decision on this signal. However, given that our experiment was not 
set up to distinguish between these (and other) potential underlying motivations for the existence 
of choice compensators we leave it for future research to pin down the exact source of this be-
havior .  
Despite the logic behind luck egalitarianism and choice compensation being similar, their impli-
cations are potentially very different. According to luck egalitarianism a person with a risky life-
style is to be held responsible for bad outcomes that are directly linked to her risky actions. For 
example a smoker is to be held more responsible than a non-smoker for contracting a smoking-
related disease, such as lung cancer, but she is not to be held more responsible if she suffers from 
an illness that is unrelated to smoking. Similarly, a person who makes risky investment deci-
sions, is frequently seen at casinos, and speeds with his car should, according to luck egalitari-
anism, not be compensated for losses related to his risky behavior. However, if he experiences 
bad luck that is unrelated to these behaviors, for example unemployment, he should not be 
treated differently than a person who has never set his foot in a casino, has his money in the 
mattress, and drives 10 mph below the speed limit.  
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Choice compensators are different. They hold the smoker more responsible than the non-smoker, 
regardless of whether the disease she contracts is related to smoking or not. Likewise, they re-
gard the notorious risk-taker as less deserving of unemployment compensation than his risk 
minimizing colleague even if the risk-taking of the former had nothing to do with the risk of un-
employment.  
These differences between luck egalitarians and choice compensation have policy implications. 
If society would endorse choice compensation rather than luck egalitarianism it would imply a 
step up in the extent to which agents are held responsible for their actions. This, in turn, could be 
of importance for example for which treatments a publicly financed health insurance should pay 
for, and the extent to which publically financed treatments should be made conditional on an 
individual’s general risk taking behavior.  
  
19 
 
References 
Aguiar, Fernando, Alice Becker and Luis Miller. 2013. Whose impartiality? An experimental 
study of veiled stakeholders, involved spectators and detached observers. Economics and Philos-
ophy, 29(2): pp. 155-174.  
Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos. 2005. “Fairness and Redistribution.” American 
Economic Review, 95(4), pp. 960-980. 
Arneson, Richard. 1989. “Equality and equal opportunity for welfare,” Philosophical Studies, 
56(1), pp. 159-194. 
Becker, Alice. 2013. “Accountability and the fairness bias : the effects of effort vs. luck”, Social 
Choice and Welfare, 41(3), pp. 685-699. 
Brock, J. Michelle, Andreas Lange, and Erkut Y. Ozbay (2013). ”Dictating the Risk: Experi-
mental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments.” American Economic Review, 103(1), pp. 
415-437.  
Cappelen, Alexander, Astrid D. Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen and Bertil Tungodden. 2007. ”The plu-
ralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach,” American Economic Review, 97 (3), pp. 
818-827. 
Cappelen, Alexander W., James Konow, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden. 2013. "Just 
Luck: An Experimental Study of Risk-Taking and Fairness." American Economic Review, 
103(4), pp. 1398-1413. 
Charness, Gary, and Rabin, Matthew, 2002. “Understanding social preferences with simple 
tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), pp. 817-869. 
Cherry, Todd L., Peter Frykblom and Lason F.Shogren.2002. “Hardnose the dictator,” American 
Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 1218–1221. 
Cohen, G.A., 1989. ”On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics, 99(4), pp. 906-944.  
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981a. “What is equality? Part 1: equality of welfare,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 10(3), pp. 283–345. 
20 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981b. “What is equality? Part 2: equality of resources,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 10(4), pp. 283–345. 
Dworkin, Ronald, 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Engelmann, Dirk and Strobel, Martin, 2004. „Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin 
Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments.” American Economic Review, 94(4), pp. 857-
869. 
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1999. “A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), pp. 817-868 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.” 
Experimental Economics, 10(2), pp. 171-178.  
Frohlich, Norman, Joe Oppenheimer, and Anja Kurki. 2004. ”Modeling other-regarding 
preferences and an experimental test,” Public Choice, 119(1-2), pp. 91–117. 
Gächter, Simon, and Arno Riedl.2005. “Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible 
Claims,” Management Science, 51(2), pp. 249-263.  
Gächter, Simon, and Arno Riedl. 2006. “Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems,” Social Choice 
and Welfare, 27(3), pp. 571-594.  
Konow, James. 1996. “A positive theory of economic fairness”, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 31(1), pp. 13–35. 
Konow, James. 2000. “Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation 
decisions,” American Economic Review, 90(4), pp. 1072–1091. 
Konow, James, 2009. “Is Fairness in the Eye of the Beholder? An Impartial Spectator Analysis 
of Justice.” Social Choice and Welfare, 33(1), pp. 101-127.  
Krawczyk, Michal. 2010. “A glimpse through the veil of ignorance: Equality of opportunity and 
support for redistribution?,” Journal of Public Economics, 94 (1-2), pp. 131-141. 
21 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. 2001. ”Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Reponsibility.” Ethics, 
111(3): 548-579.  
Schokkaert, Erik and Kurt Devooght. 2003. Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in 
different cultures, Social Choice and Welfare, 21(2), pp. 207–242. 
  
22 
 
Appendix A 
General instructions 
Hi and welcome! You will see instructions on your screen and we will also read the instructions 
to you, so please follow along.  
In this study you can earn money. The amount will depend on your decisions, the decisions of 
other participants and on luck.  
All cell-phones must be turned off. You are not allowed to talk with any of the other participants 
during the study. If you have questions or need help, please raise your hand and one of us will 
help you in private. 
Also, note that all participants are anonymous and that you will only be identified with the code 
number that you can find on a small piece of paper on your desk. 
The study has several parts. We will now go over the instructions for part 1. 
Part 1 instructions 
All participants have now been given 24 dollars.  
At the end of part 1, one of three events will occur. The events are called A, B and C and they 
are all equally likely to happen. The consequences of these events are as follows: 
- If event A occurs, you will keep your 24 dollars. 
- If event B occurs, you will lose your 24 dollars. 
- If event C occurs, you will lose your 24 dollars. 
Before the random draw between events A, B and C is made, you have the possibility to buy an 
insurance against the loss associated with event B. The price of the insurance is 12 dollars, but 
the cost must only be paid if you get to keep your money. 
This means that the following will happen if you decide to buy the insurance: 
- If event A occurs, you keep your 24 dollars, pay 12 dollars for the insurance and hence keep 12 
dollars. 
- If event B occurs, you keep your 24 dollars, pay 12 dollars for the insurance and hence keep 12 
dollars. 
- If event C occurs, you lose your 24 dollars and hence keep nothing.  
And the following will happen if you decide to not buy the insurance.  
- If event A occurs, you keep your 24 dollars. 
- If event B occurs, you lose your 24 dollars and hence keep nothing. 
- If event C occurs, you lose your 24 dollars and hence keep nothing. 
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In sum, the insurance does not affect the expected value of your earnings. If you buy insurance, 
you have a probability of 2/3 to get 12 dollars and if you don't buy the insurance, you have a 
probability of 1/3 to get 24 dollars. This means that the expected value is 8 dollars in both cases.  
On the next screen we will ask you some questions regarding the choice situation described 
above. Note that the sheet on your desk sums up all the information needed to answer the 
questions. 
Part 1 control questions 
Question 1: How much money is each participant allocated at the start of part 1? 
Question 2: How many dollars does it cost to insure against the loss associated with event B? 
Question 3: Which of event A, B and C is most likely to happen? Alternatives: 1) Event A. 2) 
Event B. 3) Event C. 4) They are all equally likely.  
Question 4: How much will you have after part 1, if event A happens to you? Alternatives: 1) I 
will have 24 dollars regardless of if I bought insurance or not. 2) I will have 24 dollars if I did 
not buy the insurance and 12 dollars if I did buy it. 3) I will have 0 dollars if I did not buy the 
insurance and 12 dollars if I did buy it.  
Question 5: How much will you have after part 1, if event B happens to you? Alternatives: 1) I 
will have 24 dollars regardless of if I bought insurance or not. 2) I will have 24 dollars if I did 
not buy the insurance and 12 dollars if I did buy it. 3) I will have 0 dollars if I did not buy the 
insurance and 12 dollars if I did buy it. 
Question 6: How much will you have after part 1, if event C happens to you? Alternatives: 1) I 
will have 0 dollars regardless of if I bought insurance or not. 2) I will have 24 dollars if I did not 
buy the insurance and 12 dollars if I did buy it. 3) I will have 12 dollars regardless of if I bought 
insurance or not. 
End of part 1 
You have now completed part 1 and one of the events A, B and C has been drawn. You will 
learn which event that was drawn for you at the end of the study.  
We now move on to part 2. 
Part 2 Instructions 
This part of the study is about the distribution of the earnings from part 1.  
Two other participants in this room will be randomly put together to form a pair. Your task is to 
decide how this pair's total earnings from part 1 will be split between the two of them.  
You will see several such situations where you have to make this decision. One of the situations 
that you will see has in fact happened to the pair. With 50 percent probability your decision in 
that situation will determine these participants' payoff from part 1 (with 50 percent probability it 
is determined by another participant, but it is never determined by anyone in the pair).  
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In the same way, you have also been placed in a pair with another participant, and someone else 
in this room will determine how the total earnings in your pair will be split between the two of 
you.  
Please note that you will make the distribution decision for two other people, i.e. NOT for 
yourself and the one you are paired with. In the same way, someone else will make the 
distribution decision for you and whoever you are paired with. 
Part 2 control questions 
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for part 2 correctly. When 
you have answered the questions below, please click "I understand". If any of your answers are 
incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer that question again. 
Question 1: In this part you will be matched to two other participants. Who decides how their 
earnings from part 1 are split between them? Alternatives: 1) They decide together. 2) One of 
them decides. 3) I or another participant decides (but none of the people in the pair). 
Question 2: In this part you have also been matched with one other participant to form a pair. 
Who decides how your earnings from part 1 are split between you? Alternatives: 1) Another 
participant (but not the other person in the pair) decides. 2) I decide. 3) The other person in the 
pair decides. 
End of part 2 
You have now completed part 2.  
Earnings 
You can now see your earnings from the study. 
Part 3 
While we prepare your earnings, please answer the following questions.  
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Appendix B 
In the experiment described in the main text all participants both made the insurance decisions in 
part 1 and acted as disinterested spectators in part 2. Participants who chose to insure did make 
different choices as spectators than those who chose not to insure, with the former being more 
prone to equalize the payoffs between the two agents in the pair that they were matched to (they 
decided to equalize choices in 50.6 percent (se=2.92) of the situations on average, compared to 
29.5 percent (se=5.37) for those who did not buy the insurance). The difference is highly 
statistically significant with p<0.01.  
Table B1 shows the result of the estimation of the choice random utility model, with the sample 
divided into those who choose to buy insurance and those who choose not to. When we break the 
estimation down by whether spectators chose to buy insurance for themselves or not, we see that 
those who chose not to buy insurance are more libertarian. In neither group is there any 
substantial number of luck egalitarians. 
 
The above analysis tells us that those who themselves chose to insure acted differently as 
spectators than those who did not insure. This does in itself not say that the spectators in our 
main experiment would have acted differently if they would not have made the insurance 
decision themselves, but it bids the question of whether the results would have been different if 
we had completely separated the roles in the experiment. 
Table B1. Estimation results, split by spectator's insurance decision.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share strict egalitarian, λSE 0.105 0.119 0.392 0.397
(0.071) (0.077) (0.056) (0.056)
Share libertarian, λL 0.650 0.679 0.225 0.225
(0.116) (0.112) (0.046) (0.046)
Share luck egalitarian, λLE 0.063 0.009
(0.087) (0.012)
Share choice compensation, λCC 0.182 0.202 0.374 0.378
(0.096) (0.100) (0.058) (0.059)
μ ‐0.682 ‐0.871 ‐0.902 ‐0.935
(0.388) (0.388) (0.200) (0.193)
σ 10.252 11.993 1.989 1.981
(264) (392) (0.338) (0.326)
log L ‐162.8 ‐163.1 ‐646.8 ‐647.4
No insurance bought Insurance bought
The  distribution of γi i s  parametrized such that log γ ~ N(μ, σ
2
). One  idea l  i s  estimated res idual ly, 
and standard errors  (in parentheses) are  calculated from the  estimated parameters  us ing the  
Delta  method. The  estimation approach uses  BFGS to maximize  the  l i kel ihood, after an ini tia l  
search for starting values . Total  number of decis ions  in (1) and (2): 341 (31 spectators ). Total  
number of decis ions  in  pooled data  1672 (tota l  number of spectators  152). 
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In order to investigate this, we conducted additional experimental sessions in November 2012. In 
these sessions participants made decisions either in part 1 or part 2, but never in both. Instead of 
being compensated via the earnings in part 1, the spectators were given a fixed sum of $8 (equal 
to the expected earnings in part 1) for making the distribution decisions in part 2. It was 
randomly determined in which part a particular participant would make decisions. We made 
minimal changes to the instructions to reflect these changes, but in all other respects the design 
and instructions were identical to the main experiment. All participants (also those who would 
act as spectators in part 2 and hence would not make the insurance decision) participated in the 
quiz in part 1 in order to ensure that the spectators had a similar understanding of the situation as 
they had in the original experiment.  
70 people made decisions as spectators in these sessions. Their average age was 22 years and 49 
percent were female. Their average earnings were $20 (including a fixed show-up fee).  
Just as in the main experiment, we find that the spectators were more prone to equalize earnings 
between the two participants in the pair that they were matched to when one of the people in the 
pair had experienced bad brute luck. In these situations payoffs were equalized on average 50.48 
percent (se=3.90) of the time. In the situations without bad brute luck the corresponding 
percentage was 38.29 percent (se=3.54). This difference is statistically significant with p<0.01.  
In the main text we utilized the fact that the six situations involving bad brute luck can be 
divided into three pairs (2 and 5, 4 and 6, and 8 and 10 respectively) where the insurance choice 
of person 1 and the outcomes for both P1 and P2 from part 1 are held constant. The only thing 
that differed between the two situations in each pair is whether person 2 bought insurance or not. 
In the November-sessions, where the spectators had not made the insurance decision themselves, 
we found the same pattern as in the original experiment, namely that spectators redistributed 
more when the person who suffered bad brute luck had also chose to insure against bad option 
luck. In situation 2, 51.43 percent (se=6.02) chose to equalize which is significantly less (p<0.01) 
than in situation 5 where 72.86 percent (se=5.35) equalized. The difference in situations 4 and 6 
(where 61.43 percent, se=5.86 and 24.29 percent, se=5.16 chose to equalize) and in situations 8 
and 10 (where 30.0 percent, se=5.52 and 62.86 percent, se=5.82 chose to equalize) were also 
highly statistically significant (p<0.01).  
Lastly, Table B2 shows the result of the estimation of the choice random utility model, both for 
the sessions in November only, and for the pooled data. 
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We conclude that the conclusions drawn from the main experiment holds also when the spec-
tators did not themselves make the insurance decision: 1) There are more equalizing decisions 
when one of the agents in the pair experienced bad brute luck. 2) Brute luck and option luck are 
not treated separately as is required by luck egalitarianism. 3) There are very few luck 
egalitarians among our spectators but significant shares of strict egalitarians, libertarians and 
choice compensators. 
 
Table B2. Estimation results, November sessions and pooled data.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share strict egalitarian, λSE 0.234 0.234 0.306 0.309
(0.060) (0.060) (0.039) (0.039)
Share libertarian, λL 0.495 0.495 0.369 0.370
(0.072) (0.073) (0.040) (0.040)
Share luck egalitarian, λLE 0.000 0.007
(0.000) (0.009)
Share choice compensation, λCC 0.271 0.271 0.318 0.321
(0.066) (0.066) (0.041) (0.041)
μ ‐0.580 ‐0.580 ‐0.720 ‐0.742
(0.187) (0.187) (0.143) (0.138)
σ 19.98 7.975 2.325 2.333
(38460) (84.9) (0.432) (0.429)
log L ‐435.4 ‐435.4 ‐1255 ‐1256
The  distribution of γi i s  parametrized such that log γ ~ N(μ, σ
2
). One  idea l  i s  estimated res idual ly, 
and standard errors  (in parentheses) are  calculated from the  estimated parameters  us ing the  
Delta  method. The  estimation approach uses  BFGS to maximize  the  l i kel ihood, after an ini tia l  
search for starting values . Total  number of decis ions  in (1) and (2): 770 (70 spectators ). Total  
number of decis ions  in  pooled data: 2442 (222 spectators ).  
November‐sessions All observations pooled
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Appendix C  
The post-experimental questionnaire asked the following questions: 
Question 1: Did you choose to insure against the loss associated with event B in part 1? Alter-
natives: 1) Yes. 2) No. 
Question 2: When making the decision about how to split the earnings between the two other 
participants, how concerned were you about making a fair decision? [Participant indicates on a 
scale from 1-10 where 1 is ”Not at all concerned” and 10 is ”Very concerned about fairness”] 
Question 3: Would you say that you are a person who generally tries to take very little risk or 
who takes a lot of risk? [Participant indicates on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is ”Take very little 
risk” and 10 is ”Take a lot of risk”] 
Question 4: Gender? Alternatives: 1) Male. 2) Female.  
Question 5: Year of birth? 
For the interested reader we provide an overview of the results from the questionnaire here. For 
more details, please contact the authors.  
On the question regarding how concerned the individual was about fairness when making the 
distribution decision the average answer was 7.66 (N=152, se=0.22). Spectators whose behavior 
was exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism and 
choice compensation respectively had average answer of 7.95 (N=20, se=0.456), 7.83 (N=29, 
se=0.636), 10 (N=1, se=N/A), 8.58 (N=12, se=0.260).  
The average answer regarding personal risk aversion was 5.45 (N=152, se=0.190). For those who 
decided to buy the insurance in part 1 of the experiment the answer was 5.01 (N=120, se=0.20), 
for those who did not the average answer was 7.13 (N=32, se=0.386). Spectators whose behavior 
was exactly in accordance with strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism and 
choice compensation respectively had average answer of 5.1 (N=20, se=0.624), 6.17 (N=29, 
se=0.481), 6 (N=1, se=N/A), 5.167 (N=12, se=0.534).  
Our sample consisted of 48.7 percent women (N=74) and 51.3 percent men (N=78). Women 
choose to equalize the earnings of the participants in the pair in, on average, 49.75 percent 
(se=3.59) of their distributive decisions. The corresponding percentage for men was 42.77 
(se=3.85). The gender split between spectators whose behavior was exactly in accordance with 
one of the norms considered was 55 percent women (N=11) and 45 percent men (N=9) for strict 
egalitarianism, 34.5 percent women (N=10) and 65.6 percent men (N=19) for libertarianism, 0 
percent women and 100 percent men (N=1) for luck egalitarianism, and , 58.3 percent women 
(N=7) and 41.7 percent men (N=5) for choice compensation. 
Note that this appendix describes the questionnaire data from the original experiment. For 
corresponding questionnaire data for the November sessions (described in Appendix B), please 
contact the authors.  
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Table D1: More equalizing splits in situations with bad brute luck.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bad brute luck 0.0939*** 0.191*** 0.379*** 0.837***
(0.0174) (0.0213) (0.0707) (0.102)
Gender 0.0698 0.301
(0.0527) (0.228)
d_12 ‐0.201*** ‐0.851***
(0.0266) (0.117)
d_2412 0.109*** 0.474***
(0.0372) (0.159)
Constant 0.411*** 0.413*** ‐0.362*** ‐0.394*
(0.0280) (0.0453) (0.116) (0.203)
N 1672 1672 1672 1672
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows  results  of a regression 
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal  to 1 if an equal  split was  
chosen and 0 otherwise. Specifications  (1) and two are Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) whereas  (2) and (3) are Ordered Probit (OP). Bad brute luck 
is  a dummy equal  to 1 if event C happened to any of the two persons  in 
the pair, and 0 otherwise. Gender is  a dummy equal  to 1 if the decision‐
making spectator is  female and zero otherwise. d_12 is  dummy equal  to 
1 if the outcome was  12 to person 1 and 0 to person 2. d_1224 is  dummy 
equal  to 1 if the outcome was  24 to person 1 and 12 to person 2. The 
reference outcome is  hence 24 to person 1 and 0 to person 2. Standard 
errors  clustered at spectator level  (152 spectators).
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Appendix E 
In this appendix we present details on the estimated choice model and show how our model 
predictions compare to the “exact” classifications of Table 4 in the main paper. 
As noted in the paper, the assumed utility function is 
 ܷሺݕ;·ሻ ൌ ߛ௜ܸሺݕ;·ሻ ൅ ߳௜௬ for ݕ א ሼݔ, ܺ/2ሽ. 
We assume that the utility loss function, V, is quadratic and equal to 
 
ܸሺݕ;·ሻ ൌ െ
ሺݕ െ ܨ௞ሺ௜ሻሻଶ
ܺ
, 
which is the same normalization as in Cappelen et al. (2013). Choices are made to maximize 
utility, and ߳௜௬ are assumed to be extreme value iid, which gives rise to logit choice probabilities. 
The heterogeneity consists of ሺߛ௜, ݇ሺ݅ሻሻ in which ߛ௜ measures the strength of the fairness 
motivation compared to the behaviorally stochastic terms ߳௜௬, and ݇ሺ݅ሻ is the fairness ideal of 
individual i. For an individual, this gives rise to logit choice probabilities, 
 
Λ୧୨൫γ · Δ୧୨V൯ ൌ
1
1 ൅ exp ሺെγ · Δ୧୨Vሻ
, 
where γ · Δ୧୨V is the difference in the deterministic utility loss between the actually chosen 
alternative and that of the non-chosen alternative in situation j. Integrating out the unobserved 
heterogeneity, we have the likelihood of observing the choices of an individual as 
 
L୧ ൌ ෍ λ୩
୩
න ቎ෑ Λ൫γ · Δ୧୨V൯
୎
୨ୀଵ
቏ ݂ሺγ; µ, σሻdγ
ஶ
଴
, 
where λ୩ is the population share holding ideal k and ݂ሺγ; µ, σሻ is the density of γ. We assume 
that log ߛ ~ܰሺߤ, ߪଶሻ. 
The (log) likelihood function is maximized with the BFGS method, after an initial Nelder-Mead 
search for good starting values. We use the stats4 library of R. 
Since we are estimating with individual heterogeneity, showing model fit at the individual level 
is not feasible. Instead we simulate the model with the preferred specification (Column 2 in 
Table 5 of the paper), and calculate the predicted analog of Table 4 in the paper. In Table E1 we 
see that the qualitative patterns of Table 4 are preserved in the simulations. 
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No deviations Max 1 deviation Max 2 deviations
Strict egalitarians (SE) 10.8 15.1 19.2
Libertarians (L) 10.7 15.2 19.8
Luck egalitarians (LE) 0.1 1.2 6.1
Choice compensators (CC) 9.9 13.9 18.1
Predicted analog of Table  4 in the  paper. Based on s imulations  of 10 000 datasets  in 
which (γ i ,k (i )) are  al located according to the  dis tribution estimated in Column 2, Table  
5 in the  paper. 
Table E1. Share of spectators by norm in percent, simple classification on 
predicted data.
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